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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Shawn Nathan Fisher appeals from the judgment of conviction entered
upon his conditional guilty plea to second-degree murder. Fisher asserts that,
notwithstanding precedent holding otherwise, Idaho’s “abolition of the insanity
defense violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.9 (capitalization original).)

Fisher further contends the

district court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing a fixed life sentence.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Fisher for first-degree murder, aggravated battery,
aggravated assault, use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime, felony
and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor
resisting or obstructing an officer. (R., pp.39-41.) These charges stemmed from
a crime spree involving three separate victims, including Matthew Mohler-Kerns
who died when Fisher shot him in the head, and Fisher’s subsequent capture by
law enforcement. (PSI, pp.3-5.)
Following competency proceedings and a seven month commitment to the
Idaho Security Medical Program, Fisher was deemed fit to proceed, and the court
ordered the proceedings to resume. (R., pp.60-66, 74-75, 125-141, 175-176,
182-185, 200-211, 220-221.) After proceedings resumed, Fisher filed a “Motion
to Declare I.C. §18-207 and Repeal of I.C. §[§]18-208, 209 Unconstitutional.”
(R., pp.225-226.) In his motion, Fisher argued “that the legislative abrogation of
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mental condition as a defense, I.C. §§18-207, 18-208 and 18-209, violates [his]
rights to equal protection; the effective assistance of counsel; to present a
defense; to confront the evidence against him; to due process; and, to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment” as guaranteed by the United States and
Idaho Constitutions. (R., pp.225-226.) The district court denied Fisher’s motion.
(6/17/2015 Tr., p.27, L.22 – p.36, L.8.)
Fisher entered a conditional guilty plea to an amended charge of seconddegree murder, reserving the right to challenge the district court’s denial of his
constitutional challenges to I.C. § 18-207 and the repeal of I.C. §§ 18-208 and
18-209, and the court’s ruling allowing access to Fisher by the state’s mental
health experts. (R., pp.264-273.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, the state
dismissed “all other counts.”

(R., p.272.)

The court imposed a fixed life

sentence. (R., pp.282-284.) Fisher filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.288289.)
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ISSUES
Fisher states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Should this Court find that Idaho’s abolition of the insanity
defense violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition
Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by executing a
fixed-life sentence based upon its uncertainty as to whether
Mr. Fisher will be medication compliant in the future?

(Appellant’s Brief, p.9 (capitalization original).)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
1.
Has Fisher failed to articulate any basis for concluding that the Idaho
Supreme Court’s opinions in State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 267 P.3d 709
(2011), State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991), and State v.
Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914 (1990), are manifestly wrong and must be
overruled to remedy continued injustice?
2.
Has Fisher failed to establish a fixed life sentence for the murder of
Matthew Mohler-Kerns is excessive, particularly given the district court’s
consideration of the criteria set forth in I.C. § 19-2523, the objectives of
sentencing, and the district court’s well-founded conclusions that a lesser
sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the offense and would not protect
society?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Fisher Has Failed To Articulate Any Basis For Overruling Numerous Idaho
Supreme Court Decisions Upholding The Constitutionality Of I.C. § 18-207
A.

Introduction
Fisher “acknowledges Idaho Supreme Court precedent uniformly holds

that Idaho’s abolition of the insanity defense does not violate any constitutional
provisions.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.10 (citing State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 267
P.3d 709 (2011), State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991), State v.
Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914 (1990)). Nevertheless, Fisher argues “that
these cases have been wrongly decided.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.10.) Review of
Fisher’s arguments and the controlling legal authority Fisher seeks to overturn
shows that Fisher is reasserting arguments that have already been rejected and
he has failed to present any argument or legal authority showing that the Idaho
Supreme Court’s prior precedent was wrongly decided, unwise, or unjust.
B.

Standard Of Review
Constitutional questions are subject to free review, including challenges to

the constitutionality of a statute. State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 125, 267 P.3d
709, 712 (2011) (citations omitted). Legislative acts are presumed constitutional,
“and any doubt concerning the interpretation of a statute is to be resolved in favor
of that which will render the statute constitutional.” Id. (quotations and citations
omitted).
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C.

The Idaho Supreme Court’s Repeated Decisions Upholding The
Constitutionality Of I.C. § 18-207 Are Not Wrong, Unwise, Or Unjust
“In 1982, the Idaho Legislature repealed I.C. § 18-209 (‘[m]ental disease

or defect excluding responsibility as an affirmative defense’) and enacted new
language in I.C. § 18-207(a) to provide that ‘[m]ental condition shall not be a
defense to criminal conduct.’”

Delling, 152 Idaho at 124, 267 P.3d at 711

(citation omitted, brackets original).

Although I.C. § 18-207(1) provides that

“[m]ental condition shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal conduct,” I.C.
§ 18-207(3) permits the presentation of “expert evidence on the issue of any
state of mind which is an element of the offense.” In other words, I.C. § 18-207
“removed the insanity defense as it existed previously and reduced the issue of
mental condition from the status of a formal defense to that of an evidentiary
question.”

State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 430, 825 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1991)

(emphasis added) (citing State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 710 P.2d 526 (1985)).
That evidentiary question “allow[s] consideration of evidence of mental illness
directly on the element of mens rea defining the offense.” Clark v. Arizona, 548
U.S. 735, 752 (2006). To that end, a defendant’s sanity, or lack thereof, may still
be considered in determining guilt. See Delling v. Idaho, 133 S.Ct. 504 (2012)
(characterizing I.C. § 18-207 as a “modification of the insanity defense”).
In 1990, in State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 634, 798 P.2d 914, 916
(1990), the Idaho Supreme Court considered a claim that I.C. § 18-207 violates
due process “because it prevent[s a defendant] from pleading insanity as a
defense.” Although “[n]either the federal nor state Constitutions contains any
language setting forth any such right,” Searcy “argue[d] the insanity defense is so
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deeply rooted in our legal traditions as to be considered fundamental and thus
embedded in due process.”

Id.

The Idaho Supreme Court rejected this

argument. In doing so, the Court first recognized “[t]he insanity defense has had
a long and varied history during its development in the common law,” but “[a]s
the understanding of the mental processes changed over the centuries, the
implications of a criminal defendant’s insanity have changed.” Id. at 635, 798
P.2d at 917. As a result, there has been “a wide disparity in the positions taken
on this issue both by legislatures and courts in the various states.” Id. The
position taken by the Idaho Legislature is reflected in I.C. § 18-207 and does not
violate due process. In reaching this conclusion, the Idaho Supreme Court relied
on several United States Supreme Court decisions it believed “suggest[ed] rather
convincingly” that the Supreme Court would agree. Id. at 636, 798 P.2d at 918.
“First, in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), the United States
Supreme Court rejected an argument that due process required the use of any
particular insanity test and upheld an Oregon statute which placed on the
criminal defendant the burden of proving his insanity defense” by a reasonable
doubt. Searcy, 118 Idaho at 636, 798 P.2d at 918 (emphasis added) (parallel
citation to Leland omitted).
Second, the Court found significant the language in Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514, 535-536 (1968), recognizing that the “process of adjust[ing]” the “moral
accountability of an individual” “has always been thought to be the province of
the States.” Searcy, 118 Idaho at 636, 798 P.2d at 918 (quoting Powell, 392
U.S. at 535-536). The Court also cited Justice Marshall’s statement in Powell
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that “nothing could be less fruitful than for th[e Supreme] Court to be impelled
into defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms.” Searcy, 118 Idaho
at 636, 798 P.2d at 918 (quoting Powell, 392 U.S. at 536).
Finally, the Court noted Justice Rehnquist’s comment in dissent in Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 91 (1985), that “it is highly doubtful that due process
requires a state to make available an insanity defense to a criminal defendant.”
Searcy, 118 Idaho at 636, 798 P.2d at 918 (brackets omitted, capitalization
altered).
Based on the foregoing authority, the Court concluded “it is difficult to
understand how there could be an insanity defense guaranteed by the United
States Constitution which, nevertheless, has no constitutional definition and is
subject to differing definitions by various states, and may be subject to differing
burdens of proof by the states.” Id. at 637, 798 P.2d at 918.
In 1991, one year after Searcy, the Idaho Supreme Court was again asked
to consider the constitutionally of I.C. § 18-207, including the same argument
raised in Searcy. Specifically, in Card, 121 Idaho at 428, 825 P.2d at 1084, the
defendant argued I.C. § 18-207 violates due process because “the insanity
defense is so fundamental to our system of justice that its abolishment
constitutes a denial of a fundamental constitutional right.” Id. In support of this
argument, Card asserted the Supreme Court’s decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989), “mandates the allowance of an insanity defense in death
penalty cases.” Card, 121 Idaho at 429, 825 P.2d at 1085. This assertion was
based on the following language in Penry:
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The common law prohibition against punishing “idiots” for their
crimes suggests that it may indeed be “cruel and unusual”
punishment to execute persons who are profoundly or severely
retarded and wholly lacking the capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of their actions. Because of the protections afforded
by the insanity defense today, such a person is not likely to be
convicted or face the prospect of punishment.
Card, 121 Idaho at 429, 825 P.3d at 1085 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 33).
The Idaho Supreme Court rejected Card’s claim that the language in
Penry compelled an insanity defense, noting that “the safeguard” in Penry exists
in Idaho by virtue of I.C. § 18-210’s competency requirement, the mens rea
requirements in I.C. §§ 18-114, 18-115, and 18-207, and the sentencing
provisions of I.C. § 19-2523. Card, 121 Idaho at 429, 825 P.2d at 1085. The
Court explained:
Idaho Code § 18-207 does not remove the element of
criminal responsibility for the crime. The prosecution is still
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had
the mental capacity to form the necessary intent. Idaho Code § 18207 merely disallows mental condition from providing a complete
defense to the crime and may allow the conviction of persons who
may be insane by some former insanity test or medical standard,
but who nevertheless have the ability to form intent and to control
their actions. The statute expressly allows admission of expert
evidence on the issues of mens reas or any state of mind which is
an element of the crime. See I.C. § 18-207(b). In addition, the
statutes require the sentencing judge to consider and receive
evidence of the mental condition of the defendant at the time of
sentencing. I.C. § 19-2523. This statutory process provides the
necessary safeguards and does not offend the principles of due
process as required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914
(1990).
Card, 121 Idaho at 430, 825 P.2d at 1086.
In 1992, the Idaho Supreme Court considered another due process
challenge, as well as an Eighth Amendment challenge, to I.C. § 18-207. In State
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v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 854, 828 P.2d 879, 883 (1992) (citations omitted), the
Court stated: “It is well established that absence of an insanity defense in capital
cases does not violate any constitutional protections.” The Court reiterated this
point in 1994, in State v. Moore, 126 Idaho 208, 210, 880 P.2d 238, 240 (1994),
in response to another constitutional challenge to I.C. § 18-207, and declined the
renewed invitation to “overrule its prior decisions on this issue.”
The most recent challenge to I.C. § 18-207 occurred in 2011 in Delling,
152 Idaho 122, 267 P.3d 709. Delling argued that “the ability of a defendant to
raise the issue of insanity with respect to criminal responsibility is required under
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,” and that
abolition of the traditional insanity defense that considered moral culpability was
unconstitutional because that “defense predates both constitutions, having a long
history back to the reign of Edward I in the 13 th Century” and, “[a]s such,” “the
defense is included in the respective due process clauses of both constitutions.”
Delling, 152 Idaho at 125, 267 P.3d at 712.

Delling also argued “that the

abolition of the insanity defense” violates the Sixth Amendment right to present a
defense and the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Id. Responding to the longstanding Idaho precedent holding that I.C. § 18-207 is
constitutional, Delling argued that the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in
Clark, 548 U.S. 735, rendered the Idaho Supreme Court’s previous reliance on
Leland, Powell, and Ake unjustified. Delling, 152 Idaho at 127, 267 P.3d at 714.
The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed.
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The Supreme Court’s opinion in Clark “does not invalidate the reasoning
in past Idaho opinions.”

Delling, 152 Idaho at 127, 267 P.3d at 714.

This

conclusion is supported by the express statement in Clark that the United States
Supreme Court has “never held that the Constitution mandates an insanity
defense, nor ha[s] [it] held that the Constitution does not so require,” and Clark
itself did not “call upon [the Court] to decide the matter.” Clark, 548 U.S. at 752
n.20. Thus, by its own terms, Clark did not decide whether an insanity defense is
constitutionally required.

More importantly, as noted by the Idaho Supreme

Court, the Court in Clark reiterated the observation from Leland and Powell, “that
no particular formulation [of the insanity defense] has evolved into a baseline for
due process, and that the insanity rule, like the conceptualization of criminal
offenses, is substantially open to state choice.” 548 U.S. at 752. Since “due
process imposes no single canonical formulation of legal insanity,” and because
legal

definitions

“devised

to

excuse

[one]

from

conventional

criminal

responsibility, are subject to flux and disagreement,” the Idaho Legislature was
free to do as it did – make the defendant’s mental condition a relevant evidentiary
question for the jury to consider in determining the mental element of the charged
offense instead of providing for a traditional insanity defense based upon an
alleged lack of moral culpability. See Delling, 152 Idaho at 127, 267 P.3d at 714.
Delling is the latest Idaho Supreme Court decision on this issue illustrating
the principle that the Court “will ordinarily not overrule one of [its] prior opinions
unless it is shown to have been manifestly wrong, or the holding in the case has
proven over time to be unwise or unjust.” State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518,
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272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012) (citations omitted); see also State v. Guzman, 122
Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) (“[P]rior decisions of this Court
should govern unless they are manifestly wrong or have proven over time to be
unjust or unwise.”); Card, 121 Idaho at 440-52, 825 P.2d at 1096-1108 (McDevitt,
J., specially concurring) (“While it may seem that stare decisis is a rule of
convenience, it is not. I believe that this rule requires us to stand by our prior
decisions unless there are compelling and cogent reasons that necessitate a
departure from our prior rulings.”).
Notwithstanding the weight of authority affirming the constitutionality of
I.C. § 18-207, including Delling, Fisher reasserts the same due process and
Eighth Amendment challenges already rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court,
including arguments that a complete insanity defense based on moral culpability
is constitutionally protected because it is “deeply rooted in American tradition.”
(See generally Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-16.) Fisher also argues, as did Delling,
that the Court’s reliance on Leland, Powell, and Ake was misplaced. (Appellant’s
Brief, pp.18-19.) These arguments have been considered and rejected. That
Fisher, like Delling, disagrees with the Court’s interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent does not support his assertion that the Idaho Supreme Court’s
numerous decisions upholding the constitutionality of I.C. § 18-207 were wrongly
decided, are “manifestly wrong,” or that overruling those cases “is necessary to
remedy continued injustice.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.10, 16-17.)
In addition to arguing that the Idaho Supreme Court misread Leland,
Powell, and Ake, Fisher also complains that “[i]n finding that the insanity defense
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is not constitutionally required, the Delling Court found that Idaho law protects
mentally ill individuals” by virtue of the requirements in I.C. §§ 18-210
(competency), 18-207(3) (evidence of state of mind admissible), and 19-2523
(consideration of mental illness in sentencing), but, he asserts, “[n]one of these
provisions saves Idaho’s abolition of the insanity defense from Due Process and
Eight [sic] Amendment challenges.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.20 (citing Delling, 152
Idaho at 128-131, 267 P.3d at 715-718).) This is so, Fisher argues, because
none of these statutes prevent those who are not “morally culpable” from being
convicted. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.20-21.) This argument fails as a due process
complaint because it relies on the underlying premise that the Due Process
Clause requires the traditional insanity defense based on an alleged lack of
moral culpability; it does not.

See Clark, 548 U.S. at 752 (“no particular

formulation [of the insanity defense] has evolved into a baseline for due process,
and . . . the insanity rule, like the conceptualization of criminal offenses, is
substantially open to state choice”).

Fisher’s argument also fails under the

Eighth Amendment.
“The Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishments.” Penry, 492 U.S. at 330. The Idaho Supreme Court’s
discussion of various Idaho statues in Delling was, in part, a response to
Delling’s claim that abolition of the traditional insanity defense violates the Eighth
Amendment. Delling, 152 Idaho at 130, 267 P.3d at 717. Delling’s argument
was based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Penry, 492 U.S. 302, and Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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The Idaho Supreme Court correctly

concluded that neither Ford nor Penry support the conclusion that I.C. § 18-207
violates the Eighth Amendment.
In Ford, The Supreme Court held that execution of an insane prisoner
violates the Eighth Amendment. 477 U.S. at 408-410. Three years later, the
Court in Penry considered whether execution of a mentally retarded prisoner also
violates the Eighth Amendment and concluded it did not.1 Penry, 492 U.S. at
335. Neither Ford nor Penry stand for the proposition that someone cannot be
convicted if he was “insane” at the time of his crime.

Nevertheless, Delling

contended the following statement from Penry supported his assertion that the
Eighth Amendment requires a traditional insanity defense:

“Because of the

protections afforded by the insanity defense today, [a profoundly or severely
retarded] person is not likely to be convicted or face the prospect of punishment.”
Delling, 152 Idaho at 130, 267 P.3d at 717 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 333)
(bracketed language altered). This statement does not, however, translate to the
conclusion that the Eighth Amendment, or any other constitutional provision,
requires a state to provide a traditional insanity defense based on moral
culpability, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s later statement in Clark
that it has “never held that the Constitution mandates an insanity defense” at all.
Clark, 548 U.S. at 752 n.20.
Fisher’s complaints about the Idaho Supreme Court’s reliance on the state
statutes that afford protections to mentally ill criminals ignores the fact that the

1

Penry was abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), in which the
Supreme Court held that executions of mentally retarded murderers violates the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
13

only Eighth Amendment protection actually provided for in Ford is a prohibition
on execution of the mentally ill, and Penry provided no Eighth Amendment
protection at all for the mentally ill or the mentally retarded. Neither applies to
this case because Fisher was not sentenced to a penalty of death.
At its core, Fisher’s Eighth Amendment claim is that he cannot be
punished if he is not “morally culpable” because that was true at common law.
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.21-22.)

That is not what Ford, Penry, or any other

Supreme Court case holds, and Fisher’s Eighth Amendment claim has already
been squarely rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. Rather than citing any
basis for concluding that the Idaho Supreme Court’s prior decisions were wrongly
decided, Fisher repeats arguments that have already been rejected. Such an
approach falls far short of showing that the Idaho Supreme Court has been
wrong for more than 25 years with respect to the constitutionality of I.C. § 18207.
Because Fisher “has not provided any argument that shows the
precedential cases to be wrongly decided, unwise, or unjust,” and has “failed to
introduce legal authority that demonstrates the unconstitutionality of I.C. § 18207,” he is not entitled to any relief. Delling, 152 Idaho at 131, 267 P.3d at 718.
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II.
Fisher Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Imposing A Fixed Life Sentence For The Second-Degree Murder Of Matthew
Mohler-Kerns
A.

Introduction
Fisher argues the district court abused its discretion in imposing a fixed life

sentence, asserting the “district court imposed a fixed life sentence based
entirely upon its inability to be certain that Mr. Fisher would be medication
compliant, and therefore not a danger, in the future.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.22.) A
review of the record shows this assertion is incorrect, and application of wellestablished sentencing standards to the facts presented to the district court
reveals Fisher has failed to meet his heavy burden of establishing the district
court abused its sentencing discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the

appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.”
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and
citations omitted). “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” Id.
C.

Fisher Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Imposing A Fixed Life Sentence
The applicable legal standards for reviewing a sentencing court’s exercise

of discretion are well-established. Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
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State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011); State v.
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). To carry this burden
the appellant must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of
the facts. Windom, 150 Idaho at 875, 253 P.3d at 312 (citations omitted). A
sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to achieve the primary
objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id. at 875-76, 253 P.3d at 312-13; State
v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001). “When considering the
sentence to be imposed, if the defendant’s mental condition is a significant issue,
the sentencing judge must also weigh that mental condition as a sentencing
consideration.” Delling, 152 Idaho at 132, 267 P.3d at 719 (citations omitted).
The defendant’s mental health does not, however, have to be the “controlling
factor” in imposing sentence; it is only a consideration. Id. at 132-133, 267 P.3d
at 719-720.
In imposing a fixed life sentence in this case, the district court recited the
objectives of sentencing and the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-2523 relating to
Fisher’s mental illness.
L.10.)

(9/30/2015 Tr., p.112, Ls.6-18, p.113, L.19 – p.118,

The court also considered the mitigating factors recited by Fisher,

including his mental illness, his minimal criminal record, and the fact that Fisher
“held a steady job for many years before quitting shortly” before murdering
Matthew Mohler-Kerns. (9/30/2015 Tr., p.118, L.11 – p.119, L.9.) Considering
the evidence and the applicable legal standards, the district court imposed a
fixed life sentence, stating:
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It’s clear and it’s clear beyond any doubt that a very
substantial prison sentence is required, because to do otherwise
would depreciate the seriousness of Mr. Fisher’s crimes.
Were I inclined, based on the information available to me, to
believe that there was a realistic prospect that Mr. Fisher could
safely be returned . . . to the public at some future point without a
meaningful risk, that he would engage in some kind of violent
conduct like this again in the future, the sentence I would impose
today would be different.
But I just can’t get there comfort-level wise.
Fisher and the risk he present is a profound one.

I think Mr.

(9/30/2015 Tr., p.119, L.14 – p.120, L.3.)
On appeal, although Fisher quotes the nine pages of the transcript that
reflect the district court’s thoughtful and thorough discussion of the relevant
sentencing factors, he reduces the district court’s sentencing rationale to a single
punch line, claiming the district court’s fixed life sentence was an abuse of
discretion because it was “a hedge against its uncertainty” based on its concern
that Fisher would not be “medication compliant in the future.” (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.23-26.) Fisher is incorrect.
A sentence is not a hedge against uncertainty if it is based on a “high
degree of certainty—certainty that the nature of the crime demands incarceration
until the perpetrator dies in prison, or certainty that the perpetrator never, at any
time in his life, could be safely released.” Windom, 150 Idaho at 878, 253 P.3d at
315 (quotations and citations omitted). The district court’s sentencing decision
was not based on uncertainty, it was based on a determination, supported by the
evidence, that there was no “realistic prospect” that Fisher could ever be safely
returned to the public “without a meaningful risk that he would engage in some
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kind of violent conduct,” and the risk Fisher presents to society is a “profound
one.” (9/30/2015 Tr., p.119, L.18 – p. 120, L.3.) To be sure, Fisher’s risk is
based on his behavior “in an unmedicated state” as it relates to his mental
illness, but it is also based on his history of drug use. (9/30/2015 Tr., p.112,
Ls.22-25; see also p.113, Ls.9-12.)

Importantly, however, the district court’s

concerns about Fisher’s dangerous behavior in an unmedicated state were not
based on uncertainty about Fisher’s ability to comply with medication
requirements, they were based on evidence that Fisher is not voluntarily
medication compliant, i.e., certainty that Fisher will not be medication compliant if
released from prison and certainty that Fisher would present an unreasonable
risk of danger in that situation. (9/30/2015 Tr., p.79, Ls.1-10 (testimony that
Fisher had to be forcibly medicated), p.85, L.18 – p.88, L.4 (testimony regarding
risk Fisher presents, and reduced risk predicated on treatment and medication).)
Along these lines, the district court noted, more than once, that Fisher had been
“forcibly medicated” and “has a history of declining medication.” (9/30/2015 Tr.,
p.114, Ls.18-23, p.115, Ls.7-25, p.118, Ls.8-10.)

The court also specifically

found: “Mr. Fisher, if left to his own devices, is I think rightly perceived as a risk
to not be compliant with medication regimens and to slip back into the kind of
condition he was in when he did the terrible thing he did.” (9/30/2015 Tr., p.115,
Ls.15-19.) Importantly, without treatment, Fisher “would be like he was when he
was arrested”; Fisher must get treatment to keep his “symptoms at bay.”
(9/30/2015 Tr., p.82, Ls.9-13.) Moreover, as noted by the district court, even with
medication, the symptoms of Fisher’s mental illness that resulted in the murder of
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Matthew Mohler-Kerns are not eliminated. (9/30/2015 Tr., p.114, Ls.3-14.) Even
medicated, Fisher continues to experience some delusions and is still unable to
“spend a lot of time out in the common areas due to getting overstimulated and
uncomfortable around other people.” (See 9/30/2015 Tr., p.88, L.24 – p.89, L.22
(discussion of some delusions Fisher continued to have even while medicated,
although other delusions ceased), p.91, Ls.10-22 (testimony regarding limited
socialization and “reduced” delusions and paranoia).)
Fisher’s use of illegal substances, like the bath salts found in his system at
the time of his arrest, only exacerbates the risk he presents. (9/30/2015 Tr.,
p.70, Ls.11-16, p.86, Ls.5-12; PSI, p.11.)

As explained by Fisher’s expert,

substance abuse by a schizophrenic, like Fisher, is “like putting lighter fluid on a
fire.” (9/30/2015 Tr., p.90, Ls.8-12; see also p.90, Ls.15-22.) It “enhances the
paranoia, the delusions, the heightened state of needing to protect yourself if
you’re paranoid.” (9/30/2015 Tr., p.90, Ls.12-14.) Fisher’s substance abuse
“contributed significantly” to his behavior on “the night of the incident.”
(9/30/2015 Tr., p.90, Ls.8-16; see also p.91, L.23 – p.93, L.2.)
Fisher argues that the “district court’s concern that [he] would not be
medication compliant in the future, based upon the fact that he was not
medication compliant in the past, is misguided,” because, he argues, “[t]here is
nothing in the record to suggest that after at least seven and one-half additional
years of understanding that he is schizophrenic and taking medications to help
him control his delusions, [he] would not be medication compliant.” (Appellant’s
Brief, p.27.) It is Fisher’s argument that is misguided. Unlike the district court’s
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concerns, which were based on evidence, Fisher’s argument is based solely on
speculation.
That Fisher also believes his expression of remorse at sentencing, made
while medicated, demonstrates he would not “pose a threat to public safety in the
future” if he chose to remain medicated does not mean the district court’s finding
that his history of non-compliance and forced medication was a “hedge against
uncertainty.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.26-27.)
Fisher’s arguments also ignore the following admonition from Windom:
The task of sentencing is a difficult one. When evaluating
the defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation, trial judges are asked
to make a probabilistic determination of a human being’s likely
future behavior. The reality is that a sentencing judge will never
possess sufficient information about the defendant’s character, life
circumstances and past behavior so as to project future behavior
with unerring accuracy. To the contrary, the factual determination
of the defendant’s probability of re-offense will always be based on
limited data. This extraordinarily difficult task is made more difficult
because it is merely one factor to be considered by the sentencing
judge – and a subordinate consideration at that. State v. Moore, 78
Idaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956) (“Rehabilitation is not
the controlling consideration…. The primary consideration is, and
presumptively always will be, the good order and protection of
society.”).
Sentencing is less a science than an art. Judges face a
different uncertainty principle than physicists: they must make a
factual finding of the probability of future criminal behavior based
upon limited data. In so doing, they draw upon their accumulated
experience. It is precisely because of the difficulty of fashioning an
objectively appropriate sentence that this Court has adopted a
deferential standard of review of sentencing decisions.
Windom, 150 Idaho at 879, 253 P.3d at 316.
As in Windom, the district court in this case expressed valid concerns
regarding a history of being non-compliant with mental health medication and the
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danger such non-compliance presents to the public, as evidenced by the conduct
for which the defendant was being sentenced. Compare Windom, 150 Idaho at
877, 253 P.3d at 314.

The Idaho Supreme Court did not second-guess the

district court’s imposition of a fixed life sentence in Windom, and there is no
reason to second-guess the district court’s decision in this case. Windom, 150
Idaho at 879-880, 253 P.3d at 316-317.
Applying the correct, and deferential legal standard set forth in Windom,
Fisher has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in imposing a
fixed life sentence.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon Fisher’s guilty plea to second-degree murder.
DATED this 12th day of October, 2016.

__/s/ Jessica M. Lorello________
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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